Arms control diplomacy as a central factor in superpower relations is not a new phenomenon. In this book, Christopher Hall traces the rise and fall of a previous arms limitation effort, the naval treaties of the interwar years, which successfully controlled competition in the strategic weapons of that era - the battleships and other vessels of the British, American and other 'great power' navies. He shows the problems and their solutions - many of relevance today - which made the treaties possible, and their major role in the peaceful transfer of leadership of the west from the British Empire to the United States.
Arms control diplomacy as a central factor in superpower relations is not a new phenomenon. In this book, Christopher Hall traces the rise and fall of a previous arms limitation effort, the naval treaties of the interwar years, which successfully controlled competition in the strategic weapons of that era - the battleships and other vessels of the British, American and other 'great power' navies. He shows the problems and their solutions - many of relevance today - which made the treaties possible, and their major role in the peaceful transfer of leadership of the west from the British Empire to the United States.
The diplomatic, economic and naval gains made by the United States at British expense during the Great War were not necessarily permanent—while the Americans sought to build on these gains in the 1920s, the British resisted, leading to a struggle for supremacy. This collection focusses on a crucial period in the histories of both British and American foreign policy, examining the diplomatic, economic, financial, naval and strategic elements of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
The Washington Conference regulated the inter-war naval race between the world powers. In the era when it was still believed that battleships were the epitome of naval power and a sign of a country's strength, this conference led to limitations on the building of such weapons by the naval powers of Britain, the USA and Japan. This collection of essays deals with many aspects of the conference; the factors that caused it, the interests of the participating nations both present and future, and the results.
This study compares, contrasts, and evaluates both British and American naval power as well as the politics that led to the development of each prior to the Second World War.
Although the years 1921-48 saw a gradual strengthening of the so-called 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain, anglophobia remained a potent force in American political life throughout that period. In Twisting the Lion's Tail , John E. Moser examines this phenomenon, showing how traditional American images of King George III and the redcoats were revived by immigrants, farmers and other groups hoping to advance an anti-British agenda.
This volume charts how the national strategic needs of the United States of America and Great Britain created a "parallel but not joint" relationship towards the Far East as the crisis in that region evolved from 1933-39. In short, it is a look at the relationship shared between the two nations with respect to accommodating one another on certain strategic and diplomatic issues so that they could become more confident of one another in any potential showdowns with Japan.
Arms control remains a major international issue as the twentieth century closes, but it is hardly a new concern. The effort to limit military power has enjoyed recurring support since shortly after World War I, when the United States, Britain, and Japan sought naval arms control as a means to insure stability in the Far East, contain naval expenditure, and prevent another world cataclysm. Richard Fanning examines the efforts of American, British, and Japanese leaders -- political, military, and social -- to reach agreement on naval limitation between 1922 and the mid-1930s, with focus on the years 1927-30, when political leaders, statesmen, naval officers, and various civilian pressure groups were especially active in considering naval limits. The civilian and even some military actors believed the Great War had been an aberration and that international stability would reign in the near future. But the coming of the Great Depression brought a dramatic drop in concern for disarmament. This study, based on a wide variety of unpublished sources, compares the cultural underpinnings of the disarmament movement in the three countries, especially the effects of public opinion, through examination of the many peace groups that played an important role in the disarmament process. The decision to strive for arms control, he finds, usually resulted from peace group pressure and political expediency. For anyone interested in naval history, this book illuminates the beginnings of the arms limitation effort and the growth of the peace movement.
As the leading ambassador in Europe, Houghton played a key role in the major diplomatic achievements of the era, including the Dawes Plan for reparations, the Locarno security treaties, and the Kellogg-Briand peace pact. While Hougton's significant contributions to these international accords is fully explored, the major theme of this book is his emergence as chief critic of U.S. foreign policy within the Harding and Coolidge administrations.
This volume provides fresh perspectives on the international strategic environment between the two world wars. At London in 1930, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan concluded an important arms control agreement to manage the international competition in naval armaments. In particular, the major naval powers reached agreement about how many heavy cruisers they could possess. Hailed at the time as a signal achievement in international cooperation, the success at London proved short-lived. France and Italy refused to participate in the treaty. Even worse followed, as within a few years growing antagonisms among the great powers manifested itself in the complete breakdown of the interwar arms control regime negotiated at London. The resulting naval arms race would set Japan and the United States on a collision course toward Pearl Harbor.
This book is a collection of essays by leading scholars of the international history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that aims to explore the dynamics of the way in which diplomacy was conducted before, during and after the First World War. It is a history of the origins, nature and conduct of the so-called ‘new diplomacy,’ a phrase often used by historians of this period but not full understood. Other key themes include changes in the way war as a diplomatic tool was viewed in this period, primarily from the perspective of the British and American governments. This book also contributes to the growing literature on how the Paris Peace Conference and the peace treaties it produced were viewed from outside as well as inside Europe.