*This manual supersedes FM 3-0 October 2017. This publication, Field Manual FM 3-0 Operations Change 1 6 December 2017, describes how Army forces, as part of a joint team, shape operational environments (OEs), prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains against a peer threat. This manual provides a foundation for how Army forces conduct prompt and sustained large-scale combat operations. FM 3-0 is applicable to all members of the Army Profession: leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians. The principle audience for FM 3-0 is commanders, staffs, and leaders. This manual also provides the foundation for training and Army education system curricula and future capabilities development. FM 3-0 contains fundamentals, tactics, and techniques focused on fighting and winning large-scale combat operations. This manual uses historical vignettes, quotes, and graphics to reinforce the doctrine within.
This US Army field manual, Field Manual FM 3-0 Operations October 2017, is applicable to all members of the Army Profession: leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians. The principle audience for FM 3-0 is commanders, staffs, and leaders of theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades. This manual also provides the foundation for training and Army education system curricula and future capabilities development across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (known as DOTMLPF). FM 3-0 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. Today's operational environment presents threats to the Army and joint force that are significantly more dangerous in terms of capability and magnitude than those we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are actively seeking to gain strategic positional advantage. These nations, and other adversaries, are fielding capabilities to deny long-held U.S. freedom of action in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains and reduce U.S. influence in critical areas of the world. In some contexts they already have overmatch or parity, a challenge the joint force has not faced in twenty-five years. The proliferation of advanced technologies; adversary emphasis on force training, modernization, and professionalization; the rise of revisionist, revanchist, and extremist ideologies; and the ever increasing speed of human interaction makes large-scale ground combat more lethal, and more likely, than it has been in a generation. As the Army and the joint force focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other capabilities, our adversaries watched, learned, adapted, modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be required to fight. The Army and joint force must adapt and prepare for large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethal environments where enemies employ potent long range fires and other capabilities that rival or surpass our own. The risk of inaction is great; the less prepared we are to meet these challenges, the greater the likelihood for conflict with those who seek windows of opportunity to exploit. The reduction of friendly, forward-stationed forces, significant reductions in capability and capacity across the entire joint force, and the pace of modernization make it imperative that we do everything possible to prepare for worst-case scenarios. We must be ready to win with the forces we have, and having the right doctrine is a critical part of that readiness. FM 3-0 provides a doctrinal approach for our theater armies, corps, divisions and brigades to address the challenges of shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, prevailing during large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains to follow through on tactical success. FM 3-0 is about how we deter adversaries and fight a peer threat today, with today's forces and today's capabilities. It addresses operations to counter threats in three broad contexts that account for what the Nation asks its Army to do. Two chapters describe operations to defeat aggression by subversion of U.S. partners and interests, which is fundamental to winning short of war. Three chapters describe operations to defeat enemies during large-scale ground combat operations, which is fundamental to winning wars. The final chapter describes operations to complete the tasks necessary to ensure enduring outcomes, which is fundamental to achieving the ultimate strategic purpose of employing Army forces.
During warfighter exercises, it had become apparent that division and corps commanders were challenged with mission command of forces in their support areas. The commander of United States Army Forces Command directed commanders to establish a support area command post (SACP) to improve mission command. The Army's new Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (06 OCT 2017), incorporates this guidance by modifying the geographical organization of an area of operations. FM 3-0 scales down the size of the support area and adds a consolidation area. The consolidation area will be assigned to a maneuver brigade or division. This enables the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) to perform its traditional mission and focus efforts on operations in the support area. FM 3-0 formalizes the requirement for divisions and corps to establish a SACP (its doctrinal name, which is used throughout this handbook) to assist in controlling operations in the support and consolidation areas.
This manual, Army Doctrine Publication ADP 1-01 Doctrine Primer July 2019, guides Army professionals (both Soldiers and Department of the Army Civilians) in their understanding of the entire body of professional knowledge and beliefs that shape the art and science of their profession. It addresses what doctrine is, why it is important, and which major ideas underlie it. The publication also discusses the most important taxonomies and terms used in the conduct of operations and the way they fit together as a single coherent whole. The principal audience for the ADP 1-01 is all members of the Army Profession. ADP 1-01 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.Doctrine is dynamic and changing. It is based on lessons learned in current operations and training, from adaptive enemies, and after changes in force structure, technology, and social values. This publication provides the basic information necessary to understand Army doctrine and the ways it changes. It clarifies why various constructs exist and how they all fit together. It is a guide for professionals about the language of the profession. Starting with Baron von Steuben's Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, doctrine in various forms has guided the Army through peacetime and war. Lessons learned from world wars and other operations shaped and codified how Army forces operated. (Army forces refers to Army organizations whose role is to conduct operations in the field. The Army refers to the Army as an institution.) In the early 1900s, Army doctrine consisted of fewer than 40 field service regulations and drill manuals. Gradually, doctrine grew to over 500 field manuals. Although they provided tactics and procedures, these publications lacked a clear hierarchy that served to both categorize and prioritize information. Leaders sometimes struggled to determine what was truly important for all professionals and what was important only to a branch or functional area. Additionally, as doctrine evolved, it saw a prolific growth of terms and expressions used. This growth sometimes obscured the relationship of terms and expressions such that Soldiers and their leaders did not clearly understand them. The Army transition required a re-examination of Army doctrine. This transition moved the Army's focus more on readiness for large-scale combat against peer threats since 2015 and the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which had been heavily influenced by operations of the past 20 years. The 2017 version of FM 3-0 subsequently drove revisions to doctrine across all warfighting functions to ensure doctrinal publications adequately addressed both large-scale ground combat operations and those elements of the multi-domain operations future concept that could be implemented with the Army's currently fielded capabilities. As part of the effort, the Army decided to combine Army doctrine publications (known as ADPs) with their associated Army doctrine reference publications (known as ADRPs) to reduce redundancy. The Army continues to revise field manuals (known as FMs) and Army techniques publications (known as ATPs), as appropriate. These revisions make publications relevant to near-term operational environments and ensure Army doctrine is balanced to support Army forces conducting operations across the competition continuum and the range of military operations. Leaders and Soldiers must understand what Army doctrine is, what its purpose is, how it is organized, and why its information is important. The precursor to this understanding is a definitive text on the why of Army doctrine-a doctrine primer. The doctrine primer becomes the standard for evaluating future doctrine; it allows the Army to discipline the establishment of terms and the categorization of operational knowledge.
ADP 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process. It describes fundamentals for effective planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces to mission accomplishment. To comprehend doctrine contained in ADP 5-0, readers should first understand the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0. As the operations process is the framework for the exercise of command and control, readers should also understand the fundamentals of command and control and mission command described in ADP 6-0. Readers must also understand how the Army ethic guides decision making throughout the operations process (see Army doctrine on the Army profession).
This book investigates cultural influences of competitive sports on U.S. and Chinese strategic thinking and tactical behavior. Most competitive sports owe their origins to human fighting. Although they are “ritualized contests,” competitive sports have retained many aspects of human warfare, especially the use of strategy and tactics that moves human contest beyond military clashes to the subjugation of opponents without bloodshed. Cultural influences usually go unnoticed. Indeed, Washington often conducts foreign affairs like football games without knowing that is the case. Likewise, Beijing moves in Weiqi style subconsciously. This book uncovers these influences.
This book argues that the US Army has made four significant shifts in the content of its capstone operations doctrine along a spectrum of war since the end of WWII: 1) in 1954 it made a shift from a doctrine focused almost exclusively on mid-intensity conventional warfare to a doctrine that added significant emphasis to high-intensity nuclear warfare; 2) in 1962 it made an even greater shift in the opposite direction toward low-intensity unconventional warfare doctrine; 3) in 1976 it shifted back to an almost exclusive focus on mid-intensity conventional warfare content; 4) and this is where Army doctrine remained for 32 years until 2008, when it made a doctrinal shift back toward low-intensity unconventional warfare – five and seven years into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively. Closely tracking each of these shifts, the author zooms in on specific domestic, international and bureaucratic politics that had a direct impact on these shifts.
This study applies the theory of the operational artist to evaluate General Douglas MacArthur's command in the Korean War to illuminate considerations in regards to a senior military commander's authority to discuss policy and negotiate military strategy with policymakers and their responsibility to operate within the constraints imposed by policy to achieve the political aim, through the military aim. Victory emerged through the restoration of the 38th Parallel, where discourse and negotiation between policymakers and the operational artist resolved the tension between policy and military strategy, while tragedy and failure emerged in the remainder of General MacArthur's command, when the discourse failed and the operational artist disregarded policy constraints in pursuit of his own aims. The analysis implicates considerations for senior military commanders in their role as operational artists in the context of large-scale combat operations within wars of limited aims, constrained by competing interests.This compilation also includes a reproduction of the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community.Publishing Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations in October 2017, the U.S. Army shifted the priority from focusing on counterinsurgency to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), making LSCO against a peer threat represent the most significant readiness requirement. This realignment responds to a perceived threat from the military advancement and recent aggressive activity by competitor nations such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and China's activity in the South China Sea serve as examples of the intent to contest the world order. In addition, the overlapping interests between the nations heighten concern. Within this context, the potential exists for miscalculation, leading to escalation, as well as simultaneous conflict in multiple regions. This strategic environment challenges the National Command Authority (NCA), supported by military professionals, in establishing political aims and allocation of resources across competing global interests. Thus, arises the question, with consideration to the dynamics of the political environment and potential for LSCO with limited aims, what is the role of senior military commanders with relation to the NCA in the development and implementation of policy and military strategy to further U.S. interests?Carl von Clausewitz's theory On War explains the nature of war, which remains relevant in understanding warfare in the twenty-first century. He derived the nature of real, or limited, war as a political endeavor in pursuit of limited aims, establishing the necessity for the civil-military relationship. Clausewitz deduced that war is an instrument of policy, emerging from the realm of politics consisting of the interrelationship between the enmity of the people, the chance of military victory deduced by commanders, and the purpose or reason, narrative and legitimacy given by the government for the use of force. Because of political origins, the degree of force employed depends on the political aim with consideration to the conditions and capacities of the belligerents. Thus, war does not reach the logical extremes of uncontrolled violence because political interests moderate the effort. The greater the political motivation for war, the greater the belligerent contributes to the war effort.
This book employs game theory to warfare and in particular to military operations. It aims at scrutinizing the validity of the two ideas that have governed the literature on war and warfighting: One is the Clausewitzian Fog of War, which suggests that he who is able to "see" through the gunsmoke and observe his opponent’s moves before he has to commit to some strategy himself, should be able to gain an advantage over that enemy; the other is the tradition of understanding military conflict as a zero-sum game. Combined, these ideas seem to imply that war always gives rise to a second-mover advantage. This book questions the validity of this presumption at the operational level of military planning. It provides a simple but rigorous game-theoretic framework in order to analyse operational alternatives for a whole range of typical conflicts Western military forces are facing, including the most recent ones such as Anti-Access/Area-Denial and supporting host nations' counterinsurgency campaigns.
During wartime, the need for mental health professionals intensifies, and the role they play is increasingly important. This comprehensive professional reference and text presents crucial knowledge for anyone who provides direct psychological services or consultation to military, law enforcement, or intelligence personnel, or who works to enhance operational readiness. Expert contributors describe the ins and outs of working within the military system and offer guidelines for effective, ethical practice. Among the clinical applications discussed are fitness-for-duty evaluations, suicide risk assessment and prevention, substance abuse treatment, and brief psychotherapy. Operational applications include such topics as combat stress, survival training, hostage negotiation, and understanding terrorist motivation.