Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy covers the life and work of Ludwig Wittgenstein as well as the people who have worked on Wittgenstein's ideas after his death. An introductory essay, list of acronyms and abbreviations, chronology, hundreds of dictionary entries, and extensive bibliography make this an engaging reference source for students and scholars alike.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus has generated many interpretations since its publication in 1921, but over the years a consensus has developed concerning its criticisms of Russell's philosophy. In Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell, Gregory Landini draws extensively from his work on Russell's unpublished manuscripts to show that the consensus characterises Russell with positions he did not hold. Using a careful analysis of Wittgenstein's writings he traces the 'Doctrine of Showing' and the 'fundamental idea' of the Tractatus to Russell's logical atomist research program, which dissolves philosophical problems by employing variables with structure. He argues that Russell and his apprentice Wittgenstein were allies in a research program that makes logical analysis and reconstruction the essence of philosophy. His sharp and controversial study will be essential reading for all who are interested in this rich period in the history of analytic philosophy.
In this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, David Stern examines Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. He gives particular attention to both the arguments of the Investigations and the way in which the work is written, especially the role of dialogue in the book. While he concentrates on helping the reader to arrive at his or h er own interpretation of the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and to the reasons why the Investigations have inspired such a diversity of readings.
This study provides a guide to the early sections of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations - one of the greatest and most controversial works of 20th century philosophy.
Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical work is informed throughout by a particular broad theme: that the semantic and mentalistic attributes of language and human life are shown by verbal and nonverbal conduct, but that they resist incorporation into the domain of the straightforwardly factual. So argues John Koethe, in contrast to the standard view that Wittgenstein's earlier and later philosophical positions are sharply opposed.According to the received view, Wittgenstein's thinking underwent a radical transformation after the Tractatus, leading him to abandon classical realism and to develop an alternative semantics based on the notion of warranted assertability. Koethe maintains that the thesis that semantic claims are not made true by any facts whatsoever, which was a central part of Wittgenstein's early theory of elementary propositions, was one he continued to develop in his later writings, and that it is perfectly compatible with classical realism. In making his case for the essential continuity of Wittgenstein's thought, Koethe ranges over the entire corpus of the philosopher's writing, and concludes by pointing out connections between Wittgenstein's views and those of several contemporary philosophers, including Nagel, Dennett, Davidson, and Dummett.
This book explores the interrelated concepts of representation and grammar in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Throughout his life, Wittgenstein was obsessed with the problem of the nature of language and the relationship between language and the world. His intellectual journey, one of the most compelling in twentieth century thought, is the detailed adventure told by Gordon Hunnings in The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. This book surveys Wittgenstein's elucidation of how the world is represented in language, including the posthumously published material of his middle period. Early in his career, Wittgenstein's answer to the problem explored the representational connection between language and the world through the analogy of propositions as logical pictures of facts. Later, his mature answer elucidated the concept of the world as a construction of logical grammar. Hunnings shows how these shifting images of reality reflected in language also mirror the changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
This book presents both a new translation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus (often similar to Ogden's, but with significant improvements) and a line-by-line guide to relevant secondary literature. Rather than arguing for any particular interpretation, it presents a variety of positions for the reader to consider.
This volume of newly written chapters on the history and interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus represents a significant step beyond the polemical debate between broad interpretive approaches that has recently characterized the field. Some of the contributors might count their approach as 'new' or 'resolute', while others are more 'traditional', but all are here concerned primarily with understanding in detail the structure of argument that Wittgenstein presents within the Tractatus, rather than with its final self-renunciation, or with the character of the understanding that renunciation might leave behind. The volume makes a strong case that close investigation, both biographical and textual, into the composition of the Tractatus, and into the various influences on it, still has much to yield in revealing the complexity and fertility of Wittgenstein's early thought. Amongst these influences Kant and Kierkegaard are considered alongside Wittgenstein's immediate predecessors in the analytic tradition. The themes explored range across the breadth of Wittgenstein's book, and include his accounts of ethics and aesthetics, as well as issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and aspects of the logical framework of his account of representation. The contrast of saying and showing, and Wittgenstein's attitude to the inexpressible, is of central importance to many of the contributions. By approaching this concern through the various first-level issues that give rise to it, rather than from entrenched schematic positions, the contributors demonstrate the possibility of a more inclusive, constructive and fruitful mode of engagement with Wittgenstein's text and with each other.
Paul Horwich develops an interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writings that differs in substantial respects from what can already be found in the literature. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy—and not (as assumed by most other commentators) his identification of the meaning of a word with its use—that lies at the foundation of his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion. Thus Horwich's first aim is to give a clear account of Wittgenstein's hyper-deflationist view of what philosophy is, how it should be conducted, and what it might achieve. His second aim is to defend this view against a variety of objections: that is, to display its virtues, not merely as an accurate reading of Wittgenstein, but as the correct conception of philosophy itself. And the third aim is to examine the application of this view to a variety of topics—but primarily to language and to experience. A further distinctive feature of this approach is its presupposition that Wittgenstein's ideas may be formulated with precision and that solid arguments may be found on their behalf. This pair of guiding assumptions—the centrality of Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy, and its susceptibility to rigorous articulation and rational support—are admittedly controversial but are vindicated, not just textually, but by the power and plausibility of the philosophy that results from them.